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Title: Power analysis of voting by count and account (English)
Author: Hirokawa, Midori
Author: Vlach, Milan
Language: English
Journal: Kybernetika
ISSN: 0023-5954
Volume: 42
Issue: 4
Year: 2006
Pages: 483-493
Summary lang: English
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Category: math
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Summary: Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley–Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices. (English)
Keyword: cooperative games
Keyword: voting
Keyword: power indices
MSC: 91A12
MSC: 91B12
MSC: 91B14
idZBL: Zbl 1249.91007
idMR: MR2275350
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Date available: 2009-09-24T20:18:07Z
Last updated: 2015-03-29
Stable URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10338.dmlcz/135730
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Reference: [1] Brams S. J., Lucas W. F., (eds.) P. D. Straffin: Political and Related Models.Springer–Verlag, New York 1983 Zbl 0503.00012, MR 0682776
Reference: [2] Hirokawa M., Xu P.: Small Creditors’ Power in Civil Rehabilitation – A Compound Game of a Simple Majority and a Weighted Majority.Mimeo, Hosei University, 2005
Reference: [3] Lucas W. J.: Measuring power in weighted voting.In: Political and Related Models (S. J. Brams, W. F. Lucas, and P. D. Straffin, eds.), Springer–Verlag, New York 1983, pp. 183–238 Zbl 0514.90096
Reference: [4] Peleg B.: Voting by count and account.In: Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi (R. Selten, ed.), Springer–Verlag, New York 1992, pp. 41–51 Zbl 0856.90029
Reference: [5] Taylor A. D., Zwicker W. S.: Simple Games.Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. 1999 Zbl 0943.91005, MR 1714706
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