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Title: Stability of coalition structures and imputations in coalition-games (English)
Author: Mareš, Milan
Language: English
Journal: Kybernetika
ISSN: 0023-5954
Volume: 10
Issue: 6
Year: 1974
Pages: (461)-490
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Category: math
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MSC: 90D12
MSC: 91A12
idZBL: Zbl 0304.90135
idMR: MR0411667
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Date available: 2009-09-24T16:42:39Z
Last updated: 2012-06-05
Stable URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10338.dmlcz/124322
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Reference: [1] Aumann R. J., Maschler M.: The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games.Annals of Math. Studies, No 39, (1957), pp. 443-476. MR 0176842
Reference: [2] Harshanyi J. C.: A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative n-person Game.Annals of Math. Studies, No 40, (1959), pp. 325-355. MR 0105320
Reference: [3] Mareš M.: A Model of the Bargaining in Coalition-games with Side Payments.In: Transactions of the 6th Prague Conference on Information Theory, Statistical Decision Functions and Random Processes, 1971. Academia, Praha 1973, pp. 613-629. MR 0392002
Reference: [4] von Neumann J., Morgenstern O.: Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour.Princeton 1944.
Reference: [5] Shapley L. S.: On Balanced Sets and Cores.RAND Memorandum, RM-4601-PR, June 1965.
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