Previous |  Up |  Next


NTU games; cooperative games; balanced games
The uniform competitive solutions (u.c.s.) are basically stable sets of proposals involving several coalitions which are not necessarily disjoint. In the general framework of NTU games, the uniform competitive solutions have been defined in two earlier papers of the author (Stefanescu [5]) and Stefanescu [6]). The general existence results cover most situations formalized in the framework of the cooperative game theory, including those when the coalitional function is allowed to have empty values. The present approach concerns the situation when the coalition configurations are balanced. One shows, that if the coalitional function has nonempty values, the game admits balanced u.c.s. To each u.c.s. one associated an “ideal payoff vector” representing the utilities that the coalitions promis to the players. One proves that if the game is balanced, then the core and the strong core consist of the ideal payoff vectors associated to all balanced u.c.s.
[1] Aliprantis C. D., Brown D. J., Burkinshaw O.: Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria. Springer–Verlag, Berlin 1990 MR 1075992 | Zbl 0676.90001
[2] Bennett E., Zame W. R.: Bargaining in cooperative games. Internat. J. Game Theory 17 (1988), 279–300 DOI 10.1007/BF01254537 | MR 0977404 | Zbl 0661.90107
[3] Ichiishi T.: Game Theory for Economic Analysis. Academic Press, New York 1983 MR 0700688 | Zbl 0522.90104
[4] McKelvey R. D., Ordeshook P. C., Winer M. D.: Competitive solution for $N$-person games without transferable utility, with an application to committee games. The American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 599–615 DOI 10.2307/1954112
[5] Stefanescu A.: Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games. Kybernetika 32 (1996), 483–490 MR 1420137 | Zbl 1042.91509
[6] Stefanescu A.: Predicting proposal configurations in cooperative games and exchange economies. In: Current Trends in Economics (A. Alkan, C. D. Aliprantis and N. C. Yannelis, eds.), Springer Verlag, Berlin 1999, pp. 475–489 Zbl 0977.91005
Partner of
EuDML logo