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Article

Title: Coalitional stability and rationality in cooperative games (English)
Author: Stefanescu, Anton
Language: English
Journal: Kybernetika
ISSN: 0023-5954
Volume: 32
Issue: 5
Year: 1996
Pages: 483-490
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Category: math
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MSC: 90D12
MSC: 91A12
idZBL: Zbl 1042.91509
idMR: MR1420137
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Date available: 2009-09-24T19:04:33Z
Last updated: 2012-06-06
Stable URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10338.dmlcz/124821
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Reference: [1] W. Albers: Core and kernel-variants based on imputations and demand profiles.In: Game Theory and Related Fields (O. Moeschlin and D. Pollaschke, eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam 1979. Zbl 0434.90113, MR 0556349
Reference: [2] R. J. Aumann, M. Maschler: The bargaining set for cooperative games.In: Annals of Mathematical Studies (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton 1964, pp. 443-476. Zbl 0132.14003, MR 0176842
Reference: [3] E. Bennett: The aspirations approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in side payments games.Internat. J. Game Theory 12 (1983), 29-35. MR 0706463
Reference: [4] E. Bennett, W. R. Zame: Bargaining in cooperative games.Internat. J. Game Theory 17 (1988), 279-300. Zbl 0661.90107, MR 0977404
Reference: [5] J. Cross: Some theoretic characteristic of economics and political coalitions.J. Conflict Resolution 11 (1967), 184-195.
Reference: [6] R. D. McKelvey P. C. Ordeshook, M. D. Winer: The competitive solution for N-person games without transferable utility, with an application to commitee games.The American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 599-615.
Reference: [7] A. Stefanescu: Competitive Solutions and Uniform Competitive Solutions for Cooperative Games.Social Science Working Paper No. 868. Institute of Technology, California 1993.
Reference: [8] A. Stefanescu: Solutions for transferable utility cooperative games.RAIRO Rech. Opér. 28 (1994), 369-387. MR 1304249
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